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INTRODUCTION
The accomplishment of justice should not be the fortuitous residue of the
process in which the prosecutor participates; it should be the guiding princi-
ple for every aspect of the prosecutorial function.1
As the only attorneys charged with seeking justice, 2 prosecutors
play an important role and carry a unique burden in our justice sys-
tem.3 They are administrators of justice, 4 representing a sovereign
whose interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."15 As Robert H. Jackson explained to a group of U.S. Attorneys
over sixty years ago, "the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims,
who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches
his task with humility."'6
When Deputy Attorney GeneralJames Comey7 was the U.S. Attor-
ney for the Southern District of New York, he would tell every new
prosecutor: "Don't you ever say something you don't completely be-
lieve. I'm not even talking about shades of gray. If you don't 100
1 Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.
669, 702. Melilli was a prosecutor for five years, three and a half of which were as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia. Id. at 669 n.1.
2 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
3 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutoria! Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 727 (1999) (
[T]he ethical rules that govern the legal profession single out prosecutors
as the only participants who must adhere to a special duty beyond that of
representing zealously their "client." This higher duty has been variously
phrased to require the prosecutor "to seek justice, not merely to convict,"
and "to serve as a minister ofjustice and not simply [as] an advocate."
(citations omitted) (second alteration in original)). But see William H. Simon, Ethical Dis-
cretion in Laryermng, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1090-91 (1988) (proposing that other attor-
neys should also "seek justice," adopting "a style of ethical judgment for private lawyers
analogous to that familiarly associated with judges or prosecutors").
4 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRAION OF CRIMINALJUSTICE, THE PROSE-
CUTION FUNCTiON § 3-1.2(b) (1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], available at http://
www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc-toc.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
5 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
6 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 Am. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6
(1940-41).
7 See A] Kamen, One Show Turkey and a Lot of Fowl, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at A29;
Siobhan Roth & Vanessa Blum, Summoned to Main Justice at Time of Exodus, Scrutiny, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 7, 2003, at 1. Comey has a "reputation[ ] for placing high value on prosecutorial
integrity." Gary Fields & Greg Hitt, Ashcroft Gives Up Role in Inquiry into CIA Leak, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A4.
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percent believe it, don't you dare say it. That's why being a prosecu-
tor is so great: You don't have to make arguments you don't believe
in."" He told law students interning at the Southern District of New
York that he could "hire smart all day," but that intelligence alone was
not enough.9 Because prosecutors have the ability to ruin lives, he
explained, he looked for people who could exercise this power with
discretion and sensitivity.1 c
A few weeks later, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft stripped
the discretion that federal prosecutors need to do justice."1 In a mem-
orandum to all federal prosecutors, Ashcroft directed them to "charge
and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that
are supported by the facts of the case" with limited exceptions. 12 Fur-
thermore, the Attorney General instructed that a prosecutor "must
not request or accede to a downward departure except in the limited
circumstances specified in [the] memorandum" unless the attorney
received permission from her superior.' 3
Almost immediately, former Attorney General Janet Reno spoke
against Ashcroft's leap towards harsh uniformity: "To see that justice is
done, there has got to be the ability to focus on what's the right thing
to do in a particular case, and the right thing to do may not be the
ultimate charge. 'q14 And while a spokesman for Comey suggested that
"'[t]here [was] no real deviation from the Southern District's long-
standing policy"'1 5 regarding charging offenses, the missive from
Washington seemed likely to hinder the discretion that he suggested
was a key component of the federal prosecutor's job. The Ashcroft
Memorandum could easily force a prosecutor to "make arguments
[she doesn't] believe in."' 6
This Note examines the various ethical considerations that guide
prosecutors in exercising their discretion and the ways in which the
8 Chris Smith, Mr. Comey Goes to Washington, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 20, 2003, available at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/n 9353/index.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004).
9 Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Address at U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York Luncheon (July 22, 2003) (attended by the author).
to See id.
'1 See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Limiting Prosecutors' Use of Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2003, at Al.
12 Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors 2
(Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) and http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
13 See id. at 6.
14 John Hanna, Reno Criticizes Patriot Act, Ashcroft on Prosecutors' Discretion, ASSOCIxATED
PREss NEwSwIIrs, Sept. 23, 2003, at Westlaw, 9/23/03 APWIRES 19:50:28.
15 David Hechler, Some See Little Change, Others a Mired System, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29,
2003, at 25 (quoting spokesman for James Comey).
16 See Smith, supra note 8.
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Ashcroft Memorandum curtails that discretion.1 7 The goal is to evalu-
ate the extent to which abiding by the Ashcroft Memorandum's re-
quirements may force a prosecutor to behave unethically.'8 Part L.A
surveys prosecutorial discretion as conceived by the common law,
courts, and commentators. Part LB examines prosecutorial discretion
as described by the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standards for CriminalJustice Relating to the Prosecution Func-
tion, and the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 19 Part I.C then analyzes former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh's failed attempt to exempt federal prosecutors from ethi-
cal requirements. Part IL.A evaluates the mandates of the Ashcroft
Memorandum and considers whether a prosecutor is able to fulfill
her20 ethical obligations given the circumscription of her decision-
making powers. Part II.B examines the differences between the guide-
lines set forth by Attorney General Thornburgh and the Ashcroft
17 Rather than suggesting that unfettered discretion is an intrinsic "good" in the ad-
ministration of justice, this Note addresses only the potential tension between prosecutors'
ethical guidelines and a system that affords them little discretion. For a critique of the
dangers of too much discretion, see James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1523 (1981), which describes the scope of prosecutorial power at
that time as "both inconsistent with the fair and effective administration of justice and
unnecessary to serve the purposes offered to justify it." For an analysis of reckless and
discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Amercan
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOwA L. RFv. 393, 408, 438
(2001), which suggests that "[o]rdinary prosecutors have the same power and discretion
afforded [Whitewater Independent Counsel] Kenneth Starr" and that "[tlhe breadth of
prosecutorial discretion and the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct demonstrate the
importance of effective mechanisms of accountability."
18 At the same time, prosecutors should not simply be "'free to follow their own
lights'" in every case. See David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal
Guideline Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 889 (1996) (quotingJanet Reno's reply to Sena-
tor Hatch; for further explanation see infra note 167). Instead, a prosecutor should be
permitted to recognize and weigh the mitigating factors of each case. Most cases would
likely result in the prosecutor choosing to pursue the "most serious, readily provable of-
fense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case," which is not inconsistent with
the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirements. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at
2. As "most of the safeguards of our legal system exist for atypical cases," the fact that these
"outlier" cases might call for decisions more nuanced than those permitted by the letter of
the Ashcroft Memorandum should not be dismissed. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of
Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 901, 905 (1991).
19 Peter Krug explained where the "forms in which written criteria" for prosecutorial
discretion were available; he also discussed legislative guidelines, which this Note will not
address. See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 643,
650-652 (2002). As "[t]he rules state courts develop... are largely based on the American
Bar Association's templates[,] the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct," most, if not all, federal prosecutors must abide by
some version of one of these two ethical guidelines. Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation
of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3441, 3443 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see also infra Part
I.C (describing a congressional mandate instructing federal prosecutors to abide by the
ethical requirements of the jurisdictions in which they practice).
20 Throughout this Note, I will refer to the prosecutor as female and the defendant or
his attorney as male.
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Memorandum.2 1 Parts III.A and III.B consider the Ashcroft Memoran-
dum's requirements that prosecutors charge and pursue the most seri-
ous offense and oppose downward departures, and conclude that the
Memorandum will, in some circumstances, force prosecutors to
choose between abiding by the Memorandum's requirements and ful-
filling their ethical obligations. Next, Parts III.C and III.D address ar-
guments that justice requires uniformity among all similar crimes
regardless of the defendant's culpability. Finally, Part III.E considers
whether the concerns in this Note will be obviated if Blakely v. Wash-
ington and its progeny invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
and concludes that, regardless of the sentencing scheme, prosecutors
must be afforded sufficient discretion to fulfill their ethical mandate
to "seek justice."
I
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
In some cases, the application of the criminal laws to a particular individ-
ual, though supported by probable cause, is unwarranted in light of the indi-
vidual's lack of culpability. The prosecutor must recognize when the
circumstances of a person's situation are such that prosecution would "do
more harm than good. "22
A. Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Common Law
The duty to seekjustice is the "long-understood role of the prose-
cutor in every jurisdiction"2 3 and is realized by prosecutors with "the
power to criminally charge." 24 Prosecutors' authority to charge is gov-
erned by the Constitution, statutes, and court opinions. While prose-
cutors have exclusive authority to prosecute, they are not generally
required to do so in every case.2 5 Prosecutorial discretion is not un-
limited, but rather is constrained by "norms of equality and rationality
that are difficult to enforce in the courts."2 6 Violations of these norms
include discriminatory prosecution and complete nonenforcement of
21 This comparison is necessary to briefly rebut claims that the Ashcroft Memoran-
dum is "largely a restatement of the policy issued 14 years ago by then-Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh." Mark Corallo, Director of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice,
Letter to the Editor, Ashcrofl is Obligated to Seek Uniformity, CINCINNATI Posr, Nov. 6, 2003, at
19A.
22 HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
§ 5.3(a) (1992) (citing WAYNE R. IAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.1(c) (1985)).
23 United States ex rel. Green v. Peters, Nos. 93 C 7300, 93 C 5671, 93 C 5672, 93 C
5673, 1994 WL 8258, at *6 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1994).
24 People v. O'Neill, 379 N.Y.S.2d 244, 249 (1975).
25 See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
THE GuILTY PLEA 9 (1981) (citation omitted).
26 Id. at 11.
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a category of crime. 27 Problems of proof often defeat defendants'
charges of discriminatory prosecution, however, and victims have diffi-
culty obtaining standing to compel prosecution or proving that a pros-
ecutor has engaged in total nonenforcement of a particular crime.28
Thus, prosecutors face many occasions to exercise their discre-
tion 29 and have traditionally enjoyed great deference in wielding that
discretion. In fact, prosecutors often determine which persons should
be investigated; often choose the methods of investigation and what
information to seek as evidence; decide whom to charge with what
offense; whom to use as witnesses; and whether (and on what terms)
to enter into plea bargains and grant immunity.
30
When deciding whether to prosecute a person, prosecutors tradi-
tionally weighed factors such as the role he played in and his motiva-
tions for entering into a criminal venture, as well as his background,
criminal history, and the specific circumstances surrounding the viola-
tion. 3' Government interests also traditionally played a role in prose-
cutors' charging decisions. For example, the willingness of the
accused to assist the prosecutor in building cases against others could
lead to dismissal or reduction of the charges if the governmental in-
terest in successfully prosecuting others outweighed the interest in
convicting the accused.32 Other factors, such as the impact of the of-
fense on the victim and the community, the relative importance of the
case, and the public attitude about the prosecution could also affect
the prosecutor's charging decision. 33
In colonial days and through the 1800s a "prosecutor had unlim-
ited discretion to enter a nolle prosequi3M without any court involve-
ment. '"' The nolle was inherited from sixteenth century England,
where the Attorney General would use it to rein in a private prosecu-
tor's frivolous or unsubstantiated charges, as well as meritorious
charges that interfered with a state prosecution. 36 The nearest ana-
27 See id, at 9-10.
28 Id.
29 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987).
30 Id. at 807.
31 See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 22, §§ 5.3(a), 5.4(a).
32 See ia § 5.3(c) (citation omitted).
33 Id.
34 "To be unwilling to prosecute."
35 State v. Mucci, 782 N.E.2d 133, 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (explaining further that
"the legislators and courts of this state and the federal government have acted to take this
unlimited postindictment discretion away from the prosecutor"); see alsoIn reRichards, 213
F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Absent a controlling statute or rule to the contrary, this
power [to enter a nolle prosequil resides solely in the prosecutor's hands until the impanel-
ment and swearing of a jury."); cf. State v. Sonneland, 494 P.2d 469, 471 (Wash. 1972)
(holding that a statute abrogated the discretion to dismiss a prosecution that a prosecuting
attorney traditionally enjoyed at common law).
36 See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
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logue to the nolle in the contemporary federal system is Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a), which permits the Attorney General to
dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint by leave of the trial
judge, who often requires that the government provide some ratio-
nale for the dismissal request.37 On the other hand, some commenta-
tors and judges suggest that courts have no power to force continued
prosecution of cases that prosecutors do not believe warrant prosecu-
tion-including cases where the prosecutor does not believe she can
prove the charges at trial. 38 This suggests a functional return to the
traditional discretion afforded by nolle prosequi.
B. Modern Standards and Rules Governing Prosecutorial
Discretion
1. U.S. Attorneys' Manual Section 9-27: Principles of Federal
Prosecution
Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice in the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual (Manual) suggest that prosecutors enjoy "broad
discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, select-
ing or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions
by accepting guilty pleas ... ,,39 The Manual offers suggestions meant
to "provid[e] guidance rather than to mandat[e] results '" 40 and is in-
tended to assure the public and individual defendants that prosecu-
tors will make decisions "rationally and objectively on the merits of
each case." 4' Recognizing that the system's success hinges upon "the
character, integrity, sensitivity, and competence of those men and wo-
men who are selected to represent the public interest in the Federal
37 See d. at 17-19.
38 See id. at 20.
39 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, U.S. A--roRNEYs' MANUAL § 9-27.110 cmt [hereinafter MAN-
UAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_readingroom/usam/tifle9/
27mcrm.htm (updated Aug. 2000). The Manual discusses the factors prosecutors should
consider in deciding whether to prosecute a case:
The manner in which Federal prosecutors exercise their decision-making
authority has far-reaching implications, both in terms of justice and effec-
tiveness in law enforcement and in terms of the consequences for individ-
ual citizens. A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment
that the fundamental interests of society require the application of the
criminal laws to a particular set of circumstances-recognizing both that
serious violations of Federal law must be prosecuted, and that prosecution
entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the ac-
cused whether or not a conviction ultimately results. Other prosecutorial
decisions can be equally significant. Decisions, for example, regarding the
specific charges to be brought, or concerning plea dispositions, effectively
determine the range of sanctions that may be imposed for criminal
conduct.
Id. § 9-27.001.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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criminal justice process, '42 the Manual explains that "the prosecutor
has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether
to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law." 4-
The Manual further explains that all federal prosecutors should
"be guided by a general statement of principles that summarizes appro-
priate considerations to be weighed, and desirable practices to be fol-
lowed, in discharging their prosecutorial responsibilities." 44 Also, "it
is not intended that reference to these principles will require a partic-
ular prosecutorial decision in any given case," but rather that the Man-
ual will help prosecutors determine how best to exercise their
authority while performing their duties.45 Toward this end, the Man-
ual offers federal prosecutors guidelines to help them determine
whether to file charges against an accused.
Probable cause that the accused committed the charged crime is
an absolute prerequisite to filing charges.46 Federal prosecutors
should consider several additional factors when determining whether
to initiate prosecution, including whether a substantial federal inter-
est is served by prosecuting, whether another jurisdiction would effec-
tively prosecute, and whether an "adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution" is available. 47
Considerations relevant to ensuring that an adequate federal in-
terest exists to prosecute include: priorities of federal law enforce-
ment; the deterrent effects of prosecuting the accused; the nature and
seriousness of the crime; the criminal history of the accused, his indi-
vidual culpability and his willingness to cooperate in other investiga-
tions or prosecutions; and "[t]he probable sentence or other
consequences if the person is convicted."48
42 Id.
43 Id. § 9-27.110 cmt.
44 Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore,
[a] Ithough these principles deal with the specific situations indicated, they
should be read in the broader context of the basic responsibilities of Fed-
eral attorneys: making certain that the general purposes of the criminal
law-assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal
conduct, protection of the public from dangerous offenders, and rehabili-
tation of offenders-are adequately met, while making certain also that the
rights of individuals are scrupulously protected.
Id.
45 Id. § 9-27.120 cmt.
46 Id. § 9-27.200 cmt.
47 Id. § 9-27.220.
48 Id. § 9-27.230. Regarding culpability, the comment clarifies that "[i]f for example,
the person was a relatively minor participant in a criminal enterprise conducted by others,
or his/her motive was worthy, and no other circumstances require prosecution, the prose-
cutor might reasonably conclude that some course other than prosecution would be ap-
propriate." Id. § 9-27.230 cmt. 4. The comment also adds another consideration, "The
Person's Personal Circumstances," which permits prosecutors deciding whether to bring
[Vol. 90:237
To assess whether another jurisdiction can effectively prosecute
the accused, a prosecutor should consider whether the other jurisdic-
tion has a strong interest in prosecuting, its willingness to effectively
prosecute, and the likely sentence it will give the accuser if he is con-
victed.49 A prosecutor may decline to pursue criminal charges where
noncriminal sanctions adequately reflect the culpability of the ac-
cused and are likely to be imposed, and the effect of the noncriminal
disposition does not militate against federal law enforcement inter-
ests.50 These noncriminal dispositions include subjecting the defen-
dant to civil or administrative remedies or assigning him to a pretrial
diversion program. 51
When deciding whether to bring charges, prosecutors may not
discriminate on the basis of the race, religion, beliefs, sex, national
origin, or political affiliation of an accused, except when these charac-
teristics are a defined element of the crime. 52 For instance, the race
of the offender and his victim might be appropriate considerations in
determining whether to prosecute a civil rights violation.5 Finally,
the prosecutor cannot consider her personal feelings about the ac-
cused, the victim, or the acquaintances of the accused, or the effect of
prosecuting on the attorney's personal or professional life. 54 To en-
sure that any such inappropriate considerations do not affect prosecu-
tors' charging decisions, they must record their reasons to prosecute
or to decline prosecution.5
5
While prosecutors "should resist" departures forbidden by the
Sentencing Guidelines, the Manual does not require them to oppose
departures that the guidelines permit. 56 Prosecutors should make
sentencing recommendations when required to do so by the terms of
a plea agreement or in "unusual cases" where there is "good reason to
charges to consider the age and health of the accused as potential mitigating factors, or the
person's abuse of a position of trust as a potential aggravating factor. Id. § 9-27.230 cmt. 7.
49 Id. § 9-27.240.
50 See id. § 9-27.250.
51 Pretrial diversion programs "divert certain offenders from traditional criminal jus-
tice processing into a program of supervision and services administered by the U.S. Proba-
tion Service." Id. § 9-22.000.
52 Id. § 9-27.260.
53 See id. § 9-27.260 cmt.
54 Id. § 9-27-260 cmt.
55 See id. § 9-27.270. A prosecutor's reasons to prosecute or decline prosecuting, how-
ever, are not generally discoverable. To prove selective prosecution, a defendant must
show that the prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). To gain
access to the files necessary to prove the discriminatory purpose,. the defendant must first
present "'some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of' a selec-
tive prosecution claim," or make "a credible showing of different treatment of similarly
situated persons." Id. at 470 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.
1974)).
56 See id. § 9-27.745.
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anticipate the imposition of a sanction that would be unfair to the
defendant or inadequate in terms of society's needs. . . ."57 In such a
case, the "public interest warrants an expression of the government's
view concerning the appropriate sentence. 58 1 Thus, even if the court
has not asked for her opinion, a prosecutor might either recommend
probation where "imprisonment plainly would be inappropriate" or
recommend imprisonment rather than probation if that would be the
more appropriate punishment.59 Prosecutors must bear in mind,
however, that the "primary responsibility for sentencing lies with the
judiciary," and, therefore, they should not routinely make sentencing
recommendations. 60
One provision in the Manual suggests the degree to which the
Ashcroft Memorandum represents a departure from the discretion
historically afforded local U.S. Attorneys: "Although these materials
are designed to promote consistency in the application of Federal
criminal laws, they are not intended to produce rigid uniformity among
Federal prosecutors in all areas of the country at the expense of the fair
administration of justice."61 This language mirrors Robert H. Jackson's
1940 exhortations to the U.S. Attorneys assembled in the Great Hall
of the Department of Justice:6 2
Your responsibility in your several districts for law enforcement and
for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered to Washington, and
ought not to be assumed by a centralized Department ofJustice. It
is an unusual and rare instance in which the local District Attorney
should be superseded in the handling of litigation, except where he
requests help of Washington. 63
2. Model Standards: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to
the Prosecution Function
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Re-
lating to the Prosecution Function 64 (ABA Standards) also implicate
57 Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
58 Id. § 9-27.730.
59 Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
60 Id. But see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-
WGY, CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32-33 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (sug-
gesting prosecutors have "effective control over criminal sentencing").
61 Id. § 9-27.140 cmt. (emphasis added). A "coordinated prosecutive response" is,
however, necessary when prosecuting terrorism matters. Id. § 9-2.136. The Manual further
provides that "[i]n situations in which a modification or departure is contemplated as a
matter of policy or regular practice, the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the
Deputy Attorney General must approve the action before it is adopted." The text most
likely addresses "fast-track" programs. See, e.g., infra note 139; infra Part 1II.D.
62 Larry D. Thompson & Elizabeth BarryJohnson, Money Laundering: Business Beware,
44 AtA. L. REv. 703, 722 (1993).
63 Jackson, supra note 6, at 3-4.
64 ABA STArlDARDs, supra note 4.
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broad discretion for prosecutors in their charging decisions. While
the Department of Justice has not adopted the ABA Standards as offi-
cial policy, the Manual recognizes that courts look to them to deter-
mine prosecutors' ethical obligations and recommends that
prosecutors become familiar with them.65 The ABA Standards de-
scribe prosecutors as "administator[s] of justice," "advocate [s]," and
"officer[s] of the court,"66 and emphasize that "the duty of the prose-
cutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. '67 They also encourage
prosecutors to be reformers, actively working to remedy "inadequacies
or injustices in the substantive or procedural law."68 Furthermore,
prosecutors are subject to the laws, ethical codes, and traditions gov-
erning their jurisdictions. 69
Moreover, the ABA Standards recommend that prosecutors' of-
fices promulgate "general policies to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion" so as to "achieve a fair, efficient, and effec-
tive enforcement of the criminal law."' 70 According to the ABA Stan-
dards, prosecutors should not misrepresent factual or legal matters to
the court,7 1 and have an affirmative obligation to disclose legal au-
thority that they know is "directly adverse" to their position if defense
counsel has not already made the tribunal aware of such authority. 72
The ABA Standards additionally suggest that the prosecutor con-
sult with victims before deciding whether to prosecute the accused,
pursue a plea bargain, or dismiss charges already filed against the de-
fendant.7 Nevertheless, the prosecutor retains the initial and primary
responsibility to decide whether to institute criminal proceedings
against a defendant.7 4 In making this decision, she should consider
available noncriminal dispositions even if there is probable cause to
press criminal charges-particularly if the defendant is a first-time of-
fender and the offense is minor.75 Even when the prosecutor chooses
65 See MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-2.101.
66 Id. § 3-1.2(b).
67 Id. § 3-1.2(c).
68 Id. § 3-1.2(d).
69 See id. § 3-1.2(e); see also infra Part I.C.
70 Id. § 3-2.5(a). Compare Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney Gen-
eral, to Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 1 FED. SENT. REP. 421 (1989)
[hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum] (describing the guidelines for prosecutors as
necessary to "make sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act fair, honest, and appropri-
ate"), available at 1989 'AT 258729, with Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12 (describing
the Thornburgh Memo as ensuring "principles of equity, fairness and uniformity" and con-
cluding that " [flundamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal
criminal justice system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consistent
manner").
71 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-2.8(a).
72 Id. § 3-2.8(d).
73 See id. § 3-3.2(h).
74 Id. § 3-3.4(a).
75 See id. § 3-3.8(a).
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to bring charges, however, she "is not obliged to present all charges
which the evidence might support."76 Factors she should consider in
exercising this discretion include "the disproportion of the authorized
punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender,"
77
her reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused,78 and the
amount of harm caused by the offense. 79 The prosecutor should not
bring more or greater charges "than can reasonably be supported with
evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the
offense."8 0 Furthermore, supervisors should not compel prosecution
when there is reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.8 ' Fi-
nally, the ABA Standards encourage prosecutors to make themselves
available for individual plea discussions, and to announce a general
willingness to dispose of charges though plea bargains.
8 2
Once at trial, the prosecutor has a duty as an officer of the court
to "strict[ly] adher[e] to codes of professionalism."8 If the defendant
is convicted, "[t]he prosecutor should not make the severity of
sentences the index of . . . her effectiveness."8 4 In addition, she
should provide the court with any information relevant to the sen-
tence for the presentence report8 5 and inform the court and defense
counsel of all unprivileged mitigating information of which she is
aware, either at or before sentencing.8 6 If the prosecutor chooses to
comment on the sentence, "she should seek to assure that a fair and
informed judgment is made on the sentence and to avoid unfair sen-
tence disparities."8 7
3. Ethical Rules
a. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that prosecu-
tors are not only advocates, but also "minister[s] ofjustice" with a re-
sponsibility to ensure that the defendant receives "procedural justice"
76 See id. § 3-3,9(b).
77 Id. § 3-3.9(b) (iii).
78 See id. § 3-3.9(b)(i).
79 See id. § 3-3.9(b) (ii). Other factors the prosecutor should consider include the mo-
tives of the complainant, the victim's willingness to testify, the defendant's cooperation in
apprehending or convcting others, and the possibility of prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion. See id. § 3-3.9(b)(iv)-(vii).
80 Id. § 3-3.9(f).
81 Id. § 3-3.9(c).
82 See id. § 3-4.1(a)..
83 d. § 3-5.2(a).
84 Id. § 3-6.1(a).
85 Id. § 3-6.2(a).
86 Id. § 3-6.2(b).
87 Id. § 3-6.1(a).
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and that sufficient evidence supports a guilty verdict.8  While respon-
sibility may differ by jurisdiction, many states have adopted the ABA
Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function. 9
Thus, prosecutors must refrain from prosecuting charges not sup-
ported by probable cause,90 disclose all evidence negating the defen-
dant's guilt or mitigating the offense, and provide all unprivileged
mitigating information to both the court and defense counsel at sen-
tencing.9 1 Furthermore, as with all lawyers, if a prosecutor "knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct."92
b. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility sets aspira-
tional standards called "Ethical Considerations" and binding "Discipli-
nary Rules."93 The Code recognizes that "It]he responsibilities of a
lawyer may vary" depending on the particular obligations she may
have, including those stemming from "service as a public
prosecutor."94
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2001) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
89 See id.
90 See MODEL RULES, supra note 88, R. 3.8(a).
91 See id. R. 3.8(d). Other prosecutorial responsibilities include "mak[ing] reasonable
efforts to assure" that the defendant knows he has the right to counsel and has been given
the opportunity to obtain counsel. Id. R. 3.8(b). The Rules also require prosecutors to
refrain from seeking a waiver of important pretrial rights from an unrepresented defen-
dant, avoid subpoenaing lawyers regarding client behavior except in certain circumstances,
and refrain from making extrajudicial comments that might prejudice the defendant. See
id. R. 3.8(c), (e), (f).
92 See id. R. 1.2(e); cf MODEL RULES, supra note 88, R. 1.2 (abrogating Rule 1.2(e) and,
instead, instructing in Rule 1.4(a)(5) that "[a] lawyer shall consult with the client about
any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client ex-
pects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law"). A
government attorney's client may be "an agency official, the agency itself, the government
as a whole, or the 'public interest."' CatherineJ. I.anctot, 1"he Duty oJ Zealous Advocacy and
the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. Rav. 951,
955 (1991).
93 See Frank S. Bloch et al., Filling in the 'Larger Puzzle': Clinical Scholarship in the Wake of
The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. Rv. 221, 228 n.25 (2003) (explaining that attor-
neys "'were supposed to strive to follow the ethical considerations, but they were not con-
sidered binding'" (quoting JOHN S. DzIENKOWSKu, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES AND STATUTES: 2003-04 ABRIDGED ED. 553 (2003))). But see, e.g., Freeport-
McMoRAN Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(invoking Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-14 to scold a government civil
lawyer who suggested that the government lawyers had no obligations beyond those of
private attorneys).
94 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrry EC 7-11 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
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The Ethical Considerations state that a prosecutor's "duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict. ' '9 5 Similarly, a lawyer's duty to re-
present her client zealously does not diminish her obligation to "avoid
the infliction of needless harm" and treat others involved in the legal
process with respect.96 Thus, she should use restraint when exercising
discretionary powers97 and "refrain from instituting or continuing liti-
gation that is obviously unfair."9 1 If a prosecutor has no discretionary
power, she should recommend against continuing unfair litigation.99
The Disciplinary Rules constrain a prosecutor's discretion in less
ambitious-but more prescriptive-terms and require a prosecutor
not to institute charges when she "knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause."'100 Furthermore, she
must disclose to the defendant or defense counsel any exculpatory
evidence and any evidence that mitigates the degree of the offense or
lessens the defendant's punishment. 10 1
Finally, ABA Model Code Ethical Considerations counsel lawyers
to strive to improve the legal system. 10 2 Because laws should be 'just,
understandable, and responsive to the needs of society,"'10 lawyers
should participate in the legislative process to improve the system
"without regard to the general interests and desires of clients or for-
mer clients." 04
C. The Attorney General Cannot Exempt Federal Prosecutors
from Ethical Requirements
In a 1989 memorandum, Attorney General Thornburgh insisted
that to protect federal interests he needed the power to exempt fed-
eral prosecutors from certain rules. 10 5 He thus instructed that
subordinate federal prosecutors were exempt from "local and state
rules ... [that] frustrate the lawful operation of the federal govern-
ment." 106 Most federal courts disagreed, however, holding that the
memorandum did not shield federal prosecutors from state and local
95 Id. EC 7-13.
96 Id. EC 7-10.
97 See id.
98 Id. EC 7-14.
99 Id.
100 Id. DR 7-103(A).
1o Id. DR 7-103(B).
102 See id. EC 8-1-8-9.
to03 Id. EC 8-2.
104 Id. EC 8-1.
105 Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to All Justice Depart-
ment Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted as Exhibit E in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93
(D.N.M. 1992).
106 See id.
[Vol. 90:237
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
ethics requirements. 10 7 Congress sided with the courts and re-
sponded to the memorandum, and a similar regulation later promul-
gated under Attorney General Reno, by passing the McDade
Amendment,10 8 which expressly subjects federal prosecutors to the
ethics rules of every jurisdiction in which they practice, absent specific
authorization from Congress. 10 9 Before the McDade Amendment,
prosecutors were governed only by the ethics rules of the jurisdiction
in which they were licensed.110
Congress has since considered scaling back the McDade Amend-
ment, t"1 and some commentators have criticized the amendment for
ignoring legitimate federalism concerns and exacerbating confusion
about inconsistent state and federal ethics rules. 1 2 The amendment
nevertheless remains in force and courts still hold federal prosecutors
to the rules of professional responsibility governing the state(s) in
which they practice as well as the state(s) in which they are li-
censed.113 For example, in United States v. Parker,;"4 a federal district
court looked to ethical opinions written by the New York bar to hold
that the prosecutor did not violate the rules of professional responsi-
bility by permitting audio and visual surveillance of the defendant.' 15
The McDade Amendment demonstrates clear congressional in-
tent that federal prosecutors abide by the same ethical standards to
which their state analogs are held. Furthermore, the McDade Amend-
ment-as well as the pre-McDade cases construing Thornburgh's
memorandum-suggests that an attorney general cannot exempt fed-
eral prosecutors from ethical requirements.
107 See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113
HARV. L. Rev. 2080, 2088 (2000).
108 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118-2681-119 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B (2000)); see Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 107, at 2080. Attorney General Ja-
net Reno also tried to exempt federal prosecutors from state ethics rules. See New York
State Bar Ass'n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining the "Reno
Regulation" and describing the McDade Amendment as enacted "in the face of the Justice
Department's repeated attempts to exclude its attorneys from compliance with state bar
rules").
109 SeePub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118, 2681-118 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§530B(a) (2000)).
1 10 See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 107, at 2080.
111 See S. 22 108th Cong. (2003) (changing the name of § 530B from "Ethical stan-
dards for attorneys for the Government" to "Professional standards for Government attor-
neys," and clarifying choice of law issues regarding which jurisdiction's ethical guidelines
would govern a government attorney).
112 For a critique of the McDade Amendment, see Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note
107, at 2096-97.
11 . See United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a
federal prosecutor was bound by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct).
114 165 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
115 See id. at 476 (construing MODEL CODE, supra note 94, DR 1-102(A) (4)).
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Admittedly, the prosecutorial duty to "seek justice" is more ab-
stract than, for instance, a requirement forbidding attorneys from
contacting parties already represented by another lawyer.' 16 Moreo-
ver, a prosecutor who falls short in "seeking justice" will not likely face
disciplinary proceedings, nor is it likely that a defendant could obtain
standing to challenge a prosecutor's discretionary decision.1 7 Never-
theless, lawyers-particularly prosecutors-should hold themselves to
standards higher than the minimum necessary to avoid disciplinary
action. 18
II
THE ASHCROFT MEMORANDUM
A. The Terms
The Ashcroft Memorandum establishes Department of Justice
charging and sentencing policy in federal criminal cases. In most
cases, it requires federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts of the case ...." The memorandum provides for a few enumer-
ated exceptions, which require express authorization by an Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or another designated supervisor.l19
To support the policy set forth in the memorandum, the Attorney
General invoked the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which he de-
scribed as "a watershed event in the pursuit of fairness and consistency
116 See, e.g., In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486-87 (D.N.M. 1992).
117 See MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.150 (explaining that the provisions in the United
States Attorney's Manual are "not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litiga-
tion with the United States"). But see United States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1187 (D. Haw. 2004) ("Being sentenced pursuant to an invalid system . .. presents an
'actual, concrete invasion of a legally protected interest.'" (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))). Schnepper might suggest that, were a defendant able
to prove somehow that the lack of prosecutorial discretion curtailed his right to an actor
bound to seek justice, he might be able to obtain standing to challenge the Ashcroft Mem-
orandum. See id. Judge Easterbrook, however, has stated that "Criminals have neither a
moral nor a constitutional claim to equal or entirely proportional treatment. Constitu-
tional law is not a device allowing judges to set the 'just price' of crime, to prescribe the
ratio of retailers' to manufacturers' sentences." United States v, Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312,
1326 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
118 See, e.g., Gerald L. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
Rrv. 63, 70-71 (1980) (proffering ais "approach [to] the problems of professional ethics
from a perspective that recognizes the importance of practical judgment and moral
sentiment").
119 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2; see also United States v. Redondo-Le-
mos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining
decisions are particularly ill-suited for broad judicial oversight."); United States v. Simpson,
927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The doctrine of separation of powers requiresjudi-
cial respect for the independence of the prosecutor.").
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in the federal criminal justice system"'' 20 that was intended to promote
transparency and honesty in sentencing, guide judicial sentencing dis-
cretion, and encourage judges to impose "appropriately different pun-
ishments for offenses of differing severity." 12 1 He also suggested that
the PROTECT Act1 22 reaffirmed Congressional "commitment to the
principles of consistency and effective deterrence ... embodied in the
Sentencing Guidelines."123
Section 401 (1) (1) of the PROTECT Act instructs the Attorney
General to issue a report stating the policies and procedures adopted
by the Department of Justice pursuant to the PROTECT Act, includ-
ing information regarding every downward departure a judge has
granted. 124 Response to the reporting requirement has been criti-
cal: 125 former U.S. Attorney John S. Martin cited the new require-
ments as a key reason for his decision to retire from his thirteen-year
120 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
121 Id.
122 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter PROTECT Act] (to be
codified in scattered sections of Titles 18, 28, and 42 of the U.S. Code).
12l Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1. Congress passed the PROTECT Act on
April 30, 2003 "[t]o prevent child abduction and the sexual exploitation of children, and
for other purposes." Title IV of the PROTECT Act, known as the Feeney Amendment,
addresses sentencing reform and advocates implementing sentencing guidelines relating
to child abduction and sex offenses. See PROTECT Act § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003)
(to be codified in scattered sections of Title 18 and 28 of the U.S. Code)).
This Note only briefly addresses the reporting requirement. The Feeney Amendment
requires the Attorney General to submit a report to the House and Senate Committees on
theJudiciary every time a sentencing judge downwardly departs. The report must include
information about the facts of the case, the name of the judge, the reasons given for depar-
ture, and whether the court gave the prosecutor notice that it was planning to depart from
the Guidelines. The report also requires information about the position taken by the pros-
ecution and defense regarding the departure, whether the United States intends to file a
motion for reconsideration, and whether the government plans to appeal. See PROTECT
Act § 401(l) (2), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(l) (2) (West
Supp. 2004)).
The Feeney Amendment imposes no duty to report federal judges who upwardly de-
part when the prosecutor does not request an upward departure. In one circuit, twenty-
three out of twenty-five downward departures were overturned, while forty-four out of
forty-six upward departures were affirmed. See United States v. Yirkovsky, 338 F.3d 936,
943-45 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney J., dissenting) ("It is difficult for me to reconcile this
contrast, and I am deeply concerned with the trend and the message it sends to district
courts-that more severe sentences are far more likely to withstand appellate review.").
Importantly, almost all of these cases were tried pre-Feeney Amendment. One can antici-
pate that the new reporting requirement may further chill the ability of district judges to
downwardly depart, and may also lead a prosecutor who might otherwise accede to a de-
parture to fight it.
124 See PROTECT Act § 401(1) (2), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003).
125 See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission's
Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 98, 98 (2003) (describing thejudiciary's
response as "vibrant and persistent in its opposition" to the Feeney Amendment).
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stint as a federal district judge.126 Writing in The New York Times, he
explained that the Sentencing Guidelines impede judges in their ef-
forts to formulate just sentences, and he "no longer want[ed] to be
part of our unjust criminal justice system." 127 Judge Martin was not
averse to appropriately tough sentences: he once sentenced a gang
leader to life-plus-forty-five without communication privileges, to be
served in solitary confinement. 2 1 Nor was he alone in his criticism:
two other federal judges recently lambasted the Sentencing Guide-
lines and Attorney General Ashcroft's new reporting requirement. 129
Senator Edward Kennedy warned that the reporting requirements will
establish a "blacklist" of federal judges who choose to make downward
departures, 3 0 and the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee, John Conyers, described the requirement as a "scary" ef-
fort to assemble an "enemies list" of lenient judges.""' Chief Justice
William Rehnquist feared that the reporting requirement would "seri-
ously impair the ability of courts to impose just and reasonable
sentences.' u 32 Thus, while Ashcroft characterized his command that
all federal prosecutors "charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense or offenses" 133 as an effort to fulfill the Justice De-
partment's "legal obligation to enforce faithfully and honestly the
Sentencing Reform Act, the PROTECT Act, and the Sentencing
126 Zachary L. Berman, Judge Martin Leaves Bench Critical of Sentencing Rules, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 15, 2003, at 1.
127 John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
128 Berman, supra note 126, at 1.
129 See Mark Hamblett, Judge Takes Aim at Congress In Sentencing UN Shooter, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 22, 2003, at 1 ("Calling recent legislation in Congress aimed at reducing downward
departures by judges 'their latest attack on the third branch of government,' Judge Patter-
son gave a man who fired the shots in a political protest a lesser sentence than agreed to in
a plea agreement between the prosecution and the defense."); see also United States v.
Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) ("Congress and the Attorney Gen-
eral have instituted policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges into refusing to
depart downward, and those policies are working."); Richard B. Schmitt, Tough Sentencing
on Trial in Airline Security Breach, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at A24 (describing Kirsch).
130 Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing Provisions, and the Attorney Gen-
eral's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal Courts, FindLaw's Writ, Aug. 13, 2003
(citing concerns of numerous jurists, including Chief Justice William Rehnquist's warning
that targeting decisions made by individual judges "could amount to an unwarranted and
ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial
duties"), at http://writ.findlaw.com/allenbaugh/20030813.html (last visited Aug. 28,
2004).
131 Curt Anderson, Ashcroft to WatchJudges Whose Sentences Are Lenient, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2003, at 29. For an example of what happened when one judge reported his deci-
sion to reduce a sentence, see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A.
01-10469-WGY, CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 'WL 1381101, at *49 n.388 (D. Mass. June 18,
2004) (describing Judge Young's experience with the House Judiciary Committee after he
reduced a defendant's sentence below the recommendation in the pre-sentence report).
132 See Anderson, supra note 131, at 29.
133 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2.
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Guidelines,"'13 4 judges and others expressed concern that rigid sen-
tencing requirements were preventing just results in certain cases. 13 5
The constraints placed on judges' sentencing discretion make the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice even more important. The broad,
overlapping crimes defined by the United States Code, from which a
prosecutor must select her charges, permit the prosecutor to exercise
a great deal of power in applying the law of the statute to the facts of
the case. 136 She must be granted sufficient discretion to consider
precepts of justice when using this power.
Ashcroft provided only six exceptions to his requirement that
prosecutors charge the most serious, readily provable offense. 137 First,
if the applicable Guideline range used to impose the sentence would
not change, a prosecutor can choose not to charge or pursue a readily
provable offense.138 Second, allowance is made for "fast-track" pro-
grams relying on "charge bargaining. " 139 Third, if the evidence
changes after indictment-or for "some other justifiable reason"'14 0-
the prosecutor may dismiss the charges, but only with the written ap-
proval of the U.S. Attorney, an Assistant Attorney General, or another
designated supervisor. 14 1 Fourth, the prosecutor may "in rare circum-
stances" offer a charge reduction in a plea agreement if the defendant
provides substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another
person. 42 Fifth, while federal prosecutors are often required to file
134 Id.
135 See supra notes 125-32.
136 in fact, one commentator argues that prosecutors should be required to charge the
most specific statute applicable to the defendant's act, to the exclusion of any more gen-
eral statutes. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 90 U. VA. I.. REv. __
(forthcoming 2005). He further argues that a reinvigorated "rule of lenity" would permit
federal courts to monitor this new sentencing requirement. Id. While requiring prosecu-
tors to charge under thc more specific statute will not always result in lesser penalties, it
will not expose defendants to greater scntences than they might already face and will often
either lead to a lesser sentence for the more-specific crime, or federal declination in favor
of state prosecution. See id. (citing the thirty-year maximum for "more specific" bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000), versus the twenty-year maximum for "more general" wire,
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) or mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)).
137 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2-5.
138 Id. at 3.
139 Id. A fast-track program permits expedited disposition "whereby the Government
agrees to charge less than the most serious, readily provable offense[, but] only when
clearly warranted by local conditions within a district." Id.; see Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years
After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and
Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 Am. CraM. L. Rxv. 87, 96 n.41 (2003) ("Charge bargaining oc-
curs when prosecutors agree to accept a plea of guilty to less serious charges than those for
which the defendant would have gone to trial."); see also infra Part III.D (assessing the
legitimacy of fast-track programs).
140 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12 at 3 (giving, as examples of "justifiable rea-
sons," witness unavailability and the need to protect the identity of a witness scheduled to
testify against a more significant defendant).
141 See id.
142 See id.
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statutory enhancements 143 to increase penalties, a prosecutor can
forego the statutory enhancement in certain circumstances.1 44 If the
prosecutor offers a negotiated plea agreement after considering fac-
tors in § 9-27.420 of the Manual, she may decline to file the statutory
enhancement. 45 Additionally, a prosecutor may dismiss or forego
charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), but only under certain cir-
cumstances and with her supervisor's approval.' 46 Finally, in other
"exceptional circumstances" (and with written approval from the U.S.
Attorney, an Assistant Attorney General, or another designated super-
visor) prosecutors may decline to pursue or may dismiss readily prova-
ble charges.' 47  The supervisor should give approval when, for
example, the office is "particularly over-burdened," when the trial
might be lengthy, or when trying the case "would significantly reduce
the total number of cases disposed of by the office." 1 48
143 Statutory enhancements, except those for prior convictions, may be unconstitu-
tional after Blakely v. Washington. See 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); see also infta Part
III.E (evaluating the potential invalidation of statutory enhancements in light of Blakely).
Pre-Blakely, the government needed only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant committed additional crimes-regardless of whether he was charged with
those crimes or whether the jury returned a not guilty verdict on those crimes-for the
court to consider that information at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 156-57 (1997); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. back-
ground (2003) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES ] ("Conduct that is not formally
charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination
of the applicable guideline sentencing range."). In determining that the proper standard
of proof for the cases was a preponderance of the evidence, the Watts court "acknowl-
edge[d] a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circum-
stances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on
clear and convincing evidence," but did not address the issue. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156.
144 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4. If authorized by an Assistant Attor-
ney General, U.S. Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney, a prosecutor can forego
filing statutory enhancements in negotiated plea agreements. This is the only situation in
which such upward enhancements may be forgone.
145 See MANUAL, supra note 39, at § 9-27.420. Considerations intended to guide attor-
neys' decisions in entering into plea agreements include: the defendant's criminal history,
willingness to cooperate, remorse, and willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct,
the seriousness and nature of the crimes charged, the probable sentence if the defendant
is convicted, and the expense of trial and appeal. Id.
146 SeeAshcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4. The statute provides for a five-year
minimum sentence if a defendant possesses a firearm during a crime of violence or drug
possession. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2004). Regardless, the Ashcroft Memorandum re-
quires prosecutors to pursue the "first readily provable violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),"
and, if there are three or more readily provable violations, the first two such charges in "all
but exceptional cases." Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 4-5; see generally Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get To Trial,
Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al ("The percentage of federal criminal prosecu-
tions resolved by trials also declined, to less than 5 percent last year from 15 percent in
1962. The number of prosecutions more than doubled in the last four decades, but the
number of criminal trials fell, to 3,574 last year from 5,097 in 1962.").
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Plea agreements are similarly constrained. 149 All plea agreements
must be in writing to "facilitate efforts by the Department of Justice
and the Sentencing Commission to monitor compliance by federal
prosecutors with Department policies and the Sentencing Guide-
lines," and to avoid misunderstandings between the parties. 150 In a
July 28, 2003 memorandum regarding "Department Policies and Pro-
cedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing
Appeals," which required "honesty in sentencing" regarding both the
facts and the law, Ashcroft stated,
Any sentencing recommendation made by the United States in a
particular case must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of
the defendant's conduct and must be fully consistent with the
Guidelines and applicable statutes and with the readily provable
facts about the defendant's history and conduct.
1 5
'
Here, Ashcroft clarified that "this Memorandum by its terms
supercedes prior Department guidance" regarding plea bargains.
152
The Manual requires prosecutors to inform the court if a plea agree-
ment includes a "charge bargain," 153 and charge bargaining is only
permitted "to the extent consistent with the principles set forth" in
the six enumerated exceptions to the Memorandum's requirement
that prosecutors charge and pursue all readily provable offenses.
154
When engaging in sentence bargaining, a prosecutor may agree to a
"plea agreement for a sentence that is within the specified guideline
range,'1 55 or to endorse a downward adjustment if she genuinely be-
lieves that the defendant has accepted responsibility.1-5 6 "Fact bargain-
149 Currently, less than five percent of federal criminal prosecutions are resolved by a
trial. See Liptak, supra note 148, at Al (citing an ABA study that found that the number of
federal prosecutions doubled from 1962 to 2002, and the number of criminal trials fell
from over 5,000 to 3,574). Another criticism of the Ashcroft Memorandum is that defend-
ants will find plea bargains less attractive due to the prosecutor's reduced ability to offer
shorter sentences. Some are concerned about the flood of litigation that would result if
defendants insisted on going to trial. See, e.g., Gary Craig, Ashcroft Plea Deal Curb May Clog
Courts, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), Sept. 29, 2003, at B4 (citing a commentator
who suggested that defendants faced with the same sentence regardless of whether they
plead or went to trial will "roll the dice and go to trial"). Another, more troubling possibil-
ity, is that "'[i]f the only way you can get some sort of break is to cooperate and provide
information, you are likely to provide the information' . . . 'and the truth will be
stretched."' Shelley Murphy, Directives Against Federal Plea Bargains Spur Debate, BoSToN
GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2003, at B8 (quoting Boston defense attorney Michael Liston).
150 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
151 Id. at 5.
152 Id. This suggests that the Ashcroft Memorandum abrogates the requirements in
the Manual. See supra Part I.B.1.
153 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5. (citing MANUAL, supra note 39, §§ 9-
27.300(B), 9-27.400(B)).
154 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
155 Id. at 6.
156 Id. (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, § 3EL.). An adjustment is not
the same thing as a departure. Simplistically, adjustments are covered in chapter three of
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ing"' 57 is forbidden. 5 8 Similarly, the prosecutor cannot agree to any
plea agreement that presents the sentencing court with "less than a
full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to
sentencing."'159
Once again invoking the PROTECT Act, Ashcroft pointed out
that the Act calls for a reduction of the existing grounds for downward
departures' 60 and instructed that federal prosecutors must not re-
quest or merely stand silent when a defendant requests a downward
departure. 16' Again, however, a prosecutor may accede to or request
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and are a part of the offense level. The offense
level and the defendant's criminal history then compute the sentence, from which ajudge
may depart on grounds listed in chapter five of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
For an excellent explanation of how the Sentencing Guidelines work, see Frank 0. Bow-
man Il, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Assistance"
hPbllows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REv. 7, 10-12 (1999).
157 See Weinstein, supra note 139, at 96 n.41 (describing charge bargaining as being "at
the heart of the plea bargaining process," and fact bargaining as being "more peculiar to
the Guidelines and involv[ing] an agreement between the prosecution and defense that
the defendant will be sentenced on the basis of agreed-upon facts which will, if accepted by
the court, place the defendant in a lower sentencing range than he would likely have faced
after trial").
158 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5; see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 143, § 6B1.4 (requiring accurate stipulations of facts in plea bargains).
159 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5. This provision appears to require all
prosecutors in the sentencing phase to submit evidence suppressed as illegal in the trial-in-
chief if that evidence would affect the final sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956
F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence ex-
pressly to enhance a sentence, a districtjudge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence
at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment."). Prior to the Ashcroft Memorandum and the PROTECT Act, one commentator
pointed to prosecutors', defense attorneys', and judges' likely "resistance" to permitting
illegal evidence from intruding upon the sentencing proceedings, resulting in "needless,
unwarranted, hidden disparity contrary to the [Sentencing Reform Amendment]." Daniel
J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1740 (1992). For a discussion of the constitutional implica-
tions of using uncharged conduct-regardless of whether evidence supporting that con-
duct was suppressed because it violated the defendant's constitutional rights or because
the prosecutor simply chose to exclude it-see Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 208-13 (1991). Note, however,
that courts have long been permitted to consider uncharged conduct for sentencing pur-
poses. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) ("The due-process clause should
not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold
of trial procedure."). Blakely v. Washington and its progeny may, however, require ajury to
find any facts that compel a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence. See 542 U.S. __,
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
160 SeePROTECT Act § 401(m), 117 Star. 650, 675 (2003) (requiring the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission to "promulgate . . . appropriate amendments to the sentencing guide-
lines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence of downward
departures are substantially reduced"); cf. United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318,
1323 (D. Utah 2003) (examining legislative history to conclude that the "Feeney Amend-
ment makes no change" to a judge's ability to downwardly or upwardly depart in all but
select cases).
161 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6.
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a downward departure, if authorized by the appropriate supervisory
authority, when the defendant offers substantial assistance' 62 to the
government's case or fortuitously offended in ajurisdiction with a fast-
track program for his crime. 163
Other downward departures should be a "'rare occurenc[e],"'
and "[p]rosecutors must affirmatively oppose downward departures
that are not supported by the facts and the law, and must not agree to
'stand silent' with respect to such departures."' 64 By its terms, the
Memorandum permits prosecutors to independently review the "facts
and the law." Nevertheless, the tenor of the Memorandum and the
otherwise carefully-and narrowly-enunciated "discretion" provided
to prosecutors suggests that "facts and law" supporting departures are
likely intended to be those principles enumerated earlier in the
Memorandum.
Ashcroft concluded the Memorandum by explaining that the De-
partment of Justice must "ensure that all federal criminal cases are
prosecuted according to the same standards. Fundamental fairness
requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal justice
system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consistent
manner."165
B. Distinguishing the Thornburgh Memorandum
The Ashcroft Memorandum implies that it is a return to
prosecutorial discretion' 66 as defined by Attorney General Thorn-
burgh in 1989 (Thornburgh Memorandum)1 67 after the Supreme
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 7 (first alteration in original) (quoting SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
143, ch. 1, pt. A, (4)(b)).
165 Id. at 7.
166 See id. at 1.
167 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70. Janet Reno departed from the Thorn-
burgh Memorandum, suggesting that prosecutors may consider "such factors as [whether]
the sentencing guideline range . . . is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct...." See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Holders of U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, Tide 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. R. 352 (1994). But see
Robinson, supra note 18, at 887-89 (criticizing Janet Reno's decision to change Thorn-
burgh's standards, and reporting communication between Senator Hatch and Attorney
General Reno in which she "clarified" that "individual prosecutors are not free to follow
their own lights or to ignore legislative directives[,]" rather
it remains the directive of the Department of Justice that prosecutors
charge the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the
defendant's conduct, that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction; that
prosecutors adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines; and that charging and
plea agreements be made at an appropriate level of responsibility with ap-
propriate documentation.
). Frank Bowman noted that this response suggested that Reno reverted to the Thorn-
burgh policy. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other
Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 727-28,
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act.1' 8
While the two memoranda are similar, 169 several distinctions should
be recognized.
First, the Thornburgh Memorandum states that federal prosecu-
tors "should initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense
or offenses consistent with the defendant's conduct."'170 The Ashcroft
Memorandum requires prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most se-
rious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts of the case."' 7 1 The distinction between the "facts of the case" and
the "defendant's conduct" is significant. In requiring prosecutors to
consider the "defendant's conduct," the Thornburgh Memorandum
suggested a more individualized assessment, keyed to the defendant's
culpability.' 72 Directing prosecutors to weigh the "facts of the case,"
however, implies a less particularized assessment based more on the
provability of the elements of a crime rather than the culpability of
the criminal actor. Also, the Thornburgh Memorandum requires a
prosecutor to initially charge the most serious offense, suggesting that
the prosecutor may revisit that initial determination. 173 In contrast,
the Ashcroft Memorandum requires a prosecutor to charge and pursue
the more serious offense, suggesting that she cannot revisit her initial
decision if she uncovers mitigating circumstances that indicate a lesser
charge would be more appropriate. 174
Both memoranda permit sentence bargaining since a prosecutor
may agree to recommend a sentence at the lower end of the Guide-
lines. t7 5 Thornburgh, however, permitted prosecutors to "seek to de-
n.171 (citingJames K. Bredar &Jeffrey E. Risberg, The Reno Retreat: New Department ofJustice
"Bluesheet"DOA, 6 FED. SENT. REP. 313 (1994)). Rather than addressing whether the Reno
policy "stuck" and provided more prosecutorial discretion, this Note examines the current
policy embodied in the Ashcroft Memorandum-as compared to the Thornburgh Memo-
randum-and that policy's interaction with the conception of a prosecutor's charge to
"seek justice."
168 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
169 Compare the remarks of Professor Stephen Saltiburg, one of Thornburgh's deputy
assistant attorneys general, who stated that "'[t]he resemblance to the Thornburgh memo
is uncanny,'" with those of former Connecticut U.S. Attorney under Thornburgh Stanley
Twardy, who contended that "[t]his is the latest in Ashcroft's efforts to centralize power in
Washington.... It gives prosecutors in the field less discretion." Hechler, supra note 15, at
25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22 (emphasis added).
171 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
172 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22.
173 Id. (emphasis added).
174 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
175 Compare Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6 ("[W]hen the Sentencing
Guidelines range is 18-24 months, a prosecutor may agree to recommend a sentence of 18
or 20 months rather than argue for a sentence at the top of the range."), with Thornburgh
Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422 (stating that "prosecutors may bargain for a sentence
that is within the specified guideline range" and giving the "18-24 months example").
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part from the guidelines," as long as the plea "honestly reflect[ed] the
totality and seriousness of the defendant's conduct .... ,176 Further-
more, a prosecutor could use any of the enumerated departures to
depart without a supervisor's approval and was only required to con-
sult with supervisors if she wished to depart on grounds not specifi-
cally listed. 177
Discretion to request or accede to downward departures is much
more constrained by the Ashcroft Memorandum. Citing the PRO-
TECT Act, the Ashcroft Memorandum outlines enumerated circum-
stances in which the prosecutor may depart-all of which demand
explicit permission from an Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney,
or designated supervisory attorney. 178 Prosecutors may depart if a de-
fendant has provided "substantia' assistance, 1 79 or if their office has a
"fast-track" program for the offense.' 80 In "rare occurrences" prosecu-
tors may acquiesce in other downward departures, 181 but they must
"affirmatively oppose downward departures that are not supported by
the facts and the law, and cannot agree to 'stand silent' with respect to
such departures."18 2 Under the Ashcroft Memorandum, when prose-
cutors support a departure, they should identify the grounds to create
a record for judicial review.'1 3 Similarly, the Thornburgh Memoran-
dum expected prosecutors to "reveal to the court the departure" and
176 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-23.
177 See id. at 422 (addressing the subject of "Departures Generally").
178 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6-7 ("Congress has made clear its view
that there have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, and
it has instructed the Commission to take measures 'to ensure that the incidence of down-
ward departure [is] substantially reduced.'" (alteration in original) (citing PROTECT Act
§ 401 (m)(2) (A), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003))). The PROTECT Act also explains Congress's
intent "to ensure that Department of Justice attorneys oppose sentencing adjustments, in-
cluding downward departures, that are not supported by the facts and the law," and re-
quires that a report regarding a judge's decision to downwardly depart include "the
position of the parties with respect to the downward departure." This suggests that Con-
gress anticipated that downward departures might be filed or supported by federal prose-
cutors. See PROTECT Act §§ 401 (0 (1) (A), 401(o (2) (B) (v), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003).
179 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6. Similarly, the Thornburgh Memo-
randum describes this as "the most important departure," and suggests that "prosecutors
who bargain in good faith and who state reasons for recommending a departure should
find that judges are receptive to their recommendations." Thornburgh Memorandum,
supra note 70, at 421-23.
180 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6-7.
181 See id. at 7 (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, ch. 1, pt. A (4)(b)).
The Sentencing Commission granted the courts "legal freedom to depart from the guide-
lines," both in instances recognized by the guidelines regarding departures and on
grounds not recognized by the departure guidelines. The Commission suggests that courts
"will not [depart] very often," however, as the Sentencing Guidelines are intended to ac-
count for most factors relevant to sentencing practices. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 143, ch. 1, pt. A (4) (b)).
182 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
183 See id.
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to "afford an opportunity for the court to reject it."'a8 4 The Thorn-
burgh Memorandum, therefore, appeared to address primarily the
trial court's ability to determine the appropriateness of the departure
rather than an appellate court's ability to review the trial court's
acquiescence.18 5
Both memoranda decry fact bargaining.18 6 The Thornburgh
Memorandum did suggest, however, that providing the court with the
"true nature of the defendant's involvement in a case will not always
lead to a higher sentence."' 8 7 It also allowed the prosecutor to agree
with a defendant that self-incriminating information he provided
when cooperating would not be used against him in determining the
applicable guideline range.' 88
The Thornburgh Memorandum did not address the Department
ofJustice's position on the negotiability of statutory enhancements or
the exercise of discretion regarding their implementation. The Ash-
croft Memorandum, however, provides that statutory enhancements
are "strongly encouraged."18 9 A prosecutor may only forgo enhance-
ments through a negotiated plea agreement that is subject to several
restrictions. 190
Finally, the Thornburgh Memorandum concluded that federal
prosecutors had the "tools necessary" to arrive at "appropriate disposi-
tions in the process" so that their honest application of the Guidelines
would make sentences "fair, honest, and apprriate."' 91 The Ashcroft
Memorandum, however, describes the Thornburgh Memorandum as
intended to "ensure that [federal prosecutors'] practices were consis-
184 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22.
185 District of Massachusetts ChiefJudge William Young has described how prosecutors
could comply with the letter of the Sentencing Guidelines by simply dismissing charges if
the judge would not accede to a plea bargain. See United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-
10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-WGY, CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32 n.282
(D. Mass. June 18, 2004).
186 See supra note 157-58 and accompanying text.
187 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422-23.
188 See id. (requiring also that the agreement be included in the defendant's case file
with a note that § 5K.1.B1.8 was invoked in determining the sentence, and that the incrimi-
nating information be disclosed to the court or probation officer). Elsewhere, Thorn-
burgh gave concrete examples of how a prosecutor can bargain within the Guidelines,
"recommending a sentence at the low end of a guideline range" and "a two level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility" to yield substantially shorter sentences. Id.
189 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4. Statutory enhancements where judges
engage in fact-finding to increase a maximum sentence are likely unconstitutional under
Blakely. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); supra note 143;
infra Part III.E.
190 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4 (suggesting that an important pur-
pose in foregoing filing statutory enhancements is to induce a defendant to plead guilty, as
filing enhancements might cause the statutory sentence to exceed the Guideline range,
"ensuring that the defendant will not receive any credit for acceptance of responsibility
and will have no incentive to plead guilty").
191 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422-23 (emphasis added).
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tent with the principles of equity, fairness, and uniformity,"' 92 and pur-
ports to adopt these principles as its own. With such disparate
language, any claim that the Ashcroft Memorandum is merely a re-
turn to the principles of the Thornburgh Memorandum is indefen-
sible. The Ashcroft Memorandum represents a substantial movement
away from case-by-case determination of a defendant's culpability and
hinders prosecutors' ability to seek justice in every situation.
III
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE ASHCROFT MEMORANDUM
In holding to ethical standards, an attorney for the Government cannot be a
mere minion of the Government.193
The Ashcroft Memorandum suggests that the role of the prosecu-
tor is not unlike the unbridled advocacy often encouraged in defense
attorneys, and risks turning prosecutors into little more than the gov-
ernment's "hired guns."1 9 4 The Supreme Court, however, clearly re-
jected this conception of the prosecutorial role in Berger v. United
States.' 9 5 Furthermore, transforming federal prosecutors' responsibili-
ties into near-ministerial adherence to a memorandum that demands
uniformity at the expense of individualized justice will undermine the
individual offices' reputations for probity, integrity, and judgment, 96
as well as hinder a prosecutor's ability to comply with ethical norms
requiring her to pursue justice. The Ashcroft Memorandum may thus
represent an unfortunate new era in federal prosecution. It is not
merely an epoch in which charging and plea bargaining have been
massaged into compliance with a universal set of norms, but one in
which prosecutors' duties as ministers ofjustice recede and they don a
mantle of blind advocacy.
192 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at I (emphasis added).
193 See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 488 (D.N.M. 1992).
194 See, e.g., MONROE H. FaEDMAN, LAWYERs' ETHICS IN AN ADvERsARY SYSTEM 9-26
(1975).
195 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that "while [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one"); see also Simon, supra note 3, at 1090 (recognizing the distinc-
tion between the role of the judge and prosecutor and that of other attorneys, and arguing
that all "lawyer[s] should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice").
196 According to a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, the Southern District took its "duty
to do justice" seriously and jealously guarded its "reputation for probity, for integrity,
[and] for judgment." Surely it is not the only U.S. Attorney's office to do so. Bruce A-
Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 607-08 (1999).
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One unintended consequence of the Ashcroft Memorandum may
be prosecutorial rebellion. 9 7 Some reports about federal prosecu-
tors' reactions to the memorandum suggest that prosecutors may be
refusing to obey its directives.1 98 One anonymous federal prosecutor
commented that "where there is tension between what my local dis-
trict judge wants and what General Ashcroft wants, the local judge
wins every time." 199 Forcing prosecutors to choose between charging
a defendant beyond his culpability or not bringing charges at all could
result in unanticipated declinations that would be difficult to moni-
tor.2 0 0 Prosecutors and defense attorneys may also "collude" with
judges to avoid the unduly harsh sentences that may follow from abid-
ing by the Feeney Amendment and the Ashcroft Memorandum. 20 1 It
thus appears that goals of uniformity can be undercut by promulgat-
ing overly prescriptive and punitive rules.
It should be no consolation, however, that prosecutors may be
able to "squeeze fairness" into the Ashcroft Memorandum. 20 2 Any
197 One commentator suggested that "the tough-sounding policies [of the Ashcroft
Memorandum] include exceptions that any wise prosecutor (and there are many wise pros-
ecutors) could drive a truck through." Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecu-
tors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1257 (2004).
198 See, e.g., NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 316,
320-21 (2004); Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciamy, 109th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Blakely Senate
Hearings] (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 260&wit_id=647 (last vis-
ited Aug. 29, 2004). In July 2004, the author spoke with a Federal Public Defender who
reported that, not long after the Ashcroft Memorandum was distributed, a representative
from the local United States Attorney's Office assured the federal public defenders that the
office would make no policy changes.
Blakely itself may represent judicial rebellion against "unjust" sentencing require-
ments. Frank Bowman suggests that the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate Washing-
ton state's sentencing guidelines in Blakely, thus calling into question the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, stemmed from the "boiling frustration of the federal judiciary over
the state of the federal sentencing system." See Memorandum from Frank Bowman to the
U.S. Sentencing Commission 1-2 (June 27, 2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.
com /sentencinglaw-and -policy/ files/ frank_ bowman_ original_ memo- to_ ussc_ on
blakely.doc (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
199 King & Klein, supra note 198, at 320.
200 Thanks to Professor Stephen F. Smith for this point.
201 Blakely Senate Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law).
202 Zachary Carter, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, believes
that federal prosecutors can still "squeeze fairness into these policies," as the Ashcroft
Memorandum "makes an attempt to constrict discretion, but it doesn't do so absolutely."
Hechler, supra note 15, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Daniel Freed,
editor of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, suggested that the federal courts could still hand
down sentences tailored to the individual defendant and crime because Congress never
articulated the purpose of sentencing. See Freed, supra note 159, at 1709. Freed includes
among the "sentencers" judges, probation officers, defense attorneys, and prosecutors. Id.
at 1719-27. One might expand Freed's premise-that Congressional "punting" frees
judges to craft more individualized sentences-to permit prosecutors to continue to exer-
cise discretion. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at I ("[Flederal prosecutors
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document guiding prosecutors in their execution of the federal crimi-
nal laws should not require a stilted reading or outright disobedience
to permit them to fulfill their ethical and legal duty to seek justice. 2 3
Furthermore, the Memorandum's tight rein on prosecutorial discre-
tion may imply that the Attorney General feels that prosecutors can-
not be trusted to "make the calls" on their cases. 20 4 To John S.
Martin-the former U.S. Attorney and Southern District Judge-this
"harsh tone" was more troubling than any potential change in
protocol.20 5
The prescriptive-almost punitive-language of the Ashcroft
Memorandum stands in stark contrast to Ashcroft's earlier edict re-
quiring prosecutors to "promptly advise the Criminal Division of all
cases in which Second Amendment issues are raised." 20 6 In that mem-
orandum, by way of comparison, Ashcroft invoked the rousing lan-
guage of Berger v. United States,20 7 stating that "U] ustice is best
achieved, not by making any available argument that might win a case,
but by vigorously enforcing federal law in a manner that heeds the
commands of the Constitution." 20 8
The Memorandum might also lead to undeserved "leniency" for
more culpable offenders. By over aggregating, 20 9 the Ashcroft Memo-
randum does not only over-punish the less culpable; treating offend-
[must] adhere to the principles and objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act, the PRO-
TECT Act, and the Sentencing Guidelines ....").
2034 This duty is enhanced by the Sentencing Guidelines and the reporting require-
ment in the PROTECT Act. As a Federal Public Defender stated prior to the Ashcroft
Memorandum, "If we severely limit a judge's discretion, aren't we handing justice over to
the prosecutor?" Richard Willing, Judges Co Soft on Sentences More Often: Growing Number
Departfiom Federal Guidelines, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 28, 2003, at IA (internal quotation marks
omitted).
204 As a federal prosecutor commented, "You have to count on reasonable prosecutors
to make a reasonable assessment of what a case is worth and give them discretion" to make
decisions about cases. Murphy, supra note 149, at B8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
More acerbically, a Boston criminal defense lawyer suggested that Attorney General Ash-
croft "might as well enter his appearance and try everyone himself because he certainly
doesn't trust his prosecutors and judges." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205 See Hechler, supra note 15, at 25.
206 See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All United States Attor-
neys (Nov. 9, 2001) (noting that Ashcroft was "pleased that [the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Emerson] upholds the constitutionality of 18 U.S[.]C. 922(g)(8) .. .and
specifically affirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals, includ-
ing those not then actually a member of any militia ... to privately possess and bear their
own firearms" (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at http://www.usdoj-gov/ag/
readingroom/emerson.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
207 See id, (stating that "the mission of the Department 'in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done'" (quoting Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
208 See id.
200 Aggregation is "the treatment of many cases all at once." Alschuler, supra note 18,
at 904.
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ers of differing culpability alike2 10 means that the more culpable are
under-punished relative to others convicted of the same crime. 21 1 For
instance, a longshoreman-a "good, honest worker" with a clean re-
cord-who accepted five dollars to drive his friend to a hamburger
stand so the friend could make a drug transaction was sentenced to
ten years in prison, the statutory maximum. 2 12 Someone who had ac-
tually purchased the drugs and resold them would have been exposed
to about the same sentence. If the criminal justice system intends to
link the punishment and the crime in some rational way, punishing
the less culpable as harshly as the more culpable fails to satisfy that
objective.2 13 To the extent that punishment schemes are intended to
reflect the loss suffered by an individual victim or society at large, pun-
ishing a less culpable offender as much as a more culpable offender
may send a message to the victims of the latter that the system does
not appreciate their greater loss. Therefore, even if the Justice De-
partment has the "prerogative" 214 to strip discretion from prosecutors,
the ethical dilemma those prosecutors face is still present. Prosecu-
tors cannot evade their ethical duties by submitting a copy of their
boss's memorandum.
210 As Senator Leahy commented at the Blakely hearings, "[J]ustice is not just about
treating like cases alike; it is also about treating different cases differently." Blakely Senate
Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
211 As H.L.A. Hart observed, "Principles ofjustice or fairness between different offend-
ers require morally distinguishable offences to be treated differently and morally similar
offences to be treated alike." H.L.A. HART, LAw, LiBERrY, AND MORALTY 36-37 (1963).
212 See New Drug Law Leaves No Room for Mercy, Cm. TRiB, Oct. 5, 1989, at 28C. District
Judge William Schwarzer, who sobbed openly during the sentencing, stated, "We are re-
quired to follow the rule of law ... but in this case the law does anything but serve jus-
tice.... It may profit us very little to win the war on drugs if in the process we lose our
soul." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Schwarzer later called the sen-
tence he imposed "a grave miscarriage of justice," required by a statute that turns judges
into "computers automatically imposing sentences without regard to what is just and right."
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ira Eisenberg, An Alligator for the New AG, PLAIN
DEALER (CLEV.), April 3, 1993, at 7B. Judge Schwarzer, "a Republican known for his tough
decisions and dour demeanor," quit the bench not long after he handed down the long-
shoreman's sentence and campaigned for the repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing
laws as the head of the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. See id.
213 This Note recognizes that upward departures are available for particularly egre-
gious conduct, and that the longshoreman would likely warrant a role reduction adjust-
ment under § 3B1.2, which could result in a different sentence than that for his more
culpable friend. See SENrENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, § 3B1.2. Requiring prosecu-
tors to fight every downward departure, however, suggests that the system will not recog-
nize that some conduct is simply less damnable than that in the "heartland." The
"heartland" is the "set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline de-
scribes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguisti-
cally applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider
whether departure is warranted." Id. § 1AI. app. 4(b).
214 Federal DistrictJudge David Larimer characterized the removal ofjudge and prose-
cutor discretion and concomitant centralization of decision-making as "unfortunate," but
"also the attorney general's prerogative." See Craig, supra note 149, at B4 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
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The remainder of this Part has several objectives. First, it exam-
ines two specific instances in which the Ashcroft Memorandum
removes from prosecutors the discretion necessary to fulfill their ethi-
cal duty to seek justice. Next, this Part addresses the often-invoked
uniformity rationale for constraining discretion and suggests that the
exception for "fast-track" programs undercuts that rationale. Finally,
this Part briefly considers the potential impact of the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Blakely v. Washington.21 5
A. Charging and Pursuing the Most Serious, Readily Provable
Offense
The Ashcroft Memorandum requires prosecutors to "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are
supported by the facts of the case." 216 This requirement is inconsis-
tent with a prosecutor's traditional obligation to "recognize when the
circumstances of a person's situation are such that the prosecution
would do more harm than good,"2 1 7 and the nuanced discretion con-
templated by the ethical codes and rules governing their behavior.
The Manual (which the Ashcroft Memorandum may have super-
seded) purports that its guidelines are just that: guidelines, "not
[rules] intended to produce rigid uniformity among Federal prosecu-
tors in all areas of the country at the expense of the fair administra-
tion of justice."2 18 Such emphasis on the "fair administration of
justice" suggests that the Department of Justice-at least at one
time-afforded prosecutors some deference and permitted them to
consider mitigating and aggravating factors regarding the defendant's
culpability when charging him.2 19
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecu-
tion Function likewise emphasize the prosecutor's duty to "seek jus-
tice, not merely to convict."220 She should consider whether the
authorized punishment is proportional to the harm caused by the of-
fender. 22 1 Furthermore, the Standards state that a prosecutor "is not
obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support"222 if
the charges do not "fairly reflect the gravity of the offense." 223
215 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2558 (2004).
216 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2.
217 See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 22, § 5.3(a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218 MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.140 cmt.
219 See, e.g., id. § 9-27.230 (suggesting prosecutors consider, inter alia, "[t]he probable
sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted," as well as his criminal history
and culpability).
220 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-1.2(c).
221 See id. § 3-3.9(b) (iii).
222 Id. § 3-3.9(b).
223 Id. § 3-3.9(0.
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In addition, Ethical Considerations in the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility counsel prosecutors to "use restraint in the
discretionary exercise of government powers [by refraining] from in-
stituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. '22 4 The
Model Code also discourages the continuation of unfair litigation,
even if an individual prosecutor lacks discretionary powers.
225
Thus, none of the ethical guidelines require prosecutors to
charge and pursue the most serious offenses, and all counsel the pros-
ecutor to consider the defendant's culpability before charging him
with a crime. The Thornburgh Memorandum also recognized that
while a prosecutor "should initially charge the most serious, readily
provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant's con-
duct,"2 2 6 further investigation of a case might reveal that pursuing the
most serious offense would be inappropriate.
The Ashcroft Memorandum, on the other hand, presents an en-
tirely different picture of the prosecutorial role. It severely limits a
prosecutor's ability to revisit an initial charge after discovering that
the defendant's actual culpability may ethically require a lesser
charge-even if the "facts" may support the initial charge. In addi-
tion, the Ashcroft Memorandum "strongly encourage [s]" prosecutors
to file statutory enhancements. 227 It only permits prosecutors to
forego filing enhancements in negotiated plea agreements where the
defendant would otherwise have no incentive to plead guilty, sug-
gesting that any "leniency" is merely sentencing gamesmanship. 28
The Ashcroft Memorandum thus prevents prosecutors from making
the individualized choices that every ethical guideline appears to
require.
B. Required Opposition to Downward Departures
Curtailing a prosecutor's ability to request or accede to down-
ward departures is arguably the Ashcroft Memorandum's most troub-
ling requirement. 229 Compelling a prosecutor to ignore mitigating
224 MODEL CODE, supra note 94, EC 7-13, 7-14.
225 Id. at EC 7-14.
226 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22 (emphasis added).
227 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4.
228 .See id.
229 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6. Citing congressional displeasure
with downward departures tojustify preventing judges and inferior executive officers from
exercising their statutory discretion is troubling. In ChiefJustice William Rehnquist's 2003
annual statement, he sharply criticized the PROTECT Act reporting requirements for
judges who downwardly depart and stated that "'by constitutional design,' judges [have]
'an institutional commitment to the independent administration ofjustice and are able to
see the consequences or judicial reform proposals that legislative sponsors may not be in a
position to see.'" Linda Greenhouse, ChiefJustice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y.
TImEsJan. 1, 2004, at A14 (quoting the ChiefJustice). While Rehnquist targeted the con-
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circumstances and charge the most serious offense presents a differ-
ent dilemma than requiring her to ignore those factors when ajudge
is deciding upon a sentence. One former federal prosecutor sug-
gested thatjudicial discretion to give a lenient sentence may be appro-
priate, stating that "'[p]rosecutors know that particularly in drug
cases, the guidelines can't do perfect justice."2 30 Now that the ability
of judges to downwardly depart has been curtailed by the Feeney
Amendment, the prosecutor's role at sentencing may have changed.
Ethical guidelines counsel prosecutors to consider whether the
punishment fairly reflects the crime. The Manual directs prosecutors
to oppose unwarranted sentencing departures2 3 1 and to make sentence
recommendations when required by the terms of a plea agreement, or
in "unusual cases" when the prosecutor is concerned about the fair-
ness of a sentence. These recommendations may provide the needed
support for any suggestion that the judge increase or decrease a sen-
tence. 23 2 Similarly, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice suggest
that prosecutors consider the potential punishment when charging
the defendant. 2
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the PROTECT Act might
therefore require a prosecutor to play as active a role at the sentenc-
ing stage as she historically played at the charging stage.2 34 A prosecu-
tor in a scheme that permits the judge great discretion in sentencing
could assume that her only 'job" was to present the facts, allow the
jury to convict, and simply leave the judge to sentence 'justly." Under
the Sentencing Guidelines and PROTECT Act, however, judges'
hands are more tightly bound with regard to sentencing. For in-
stance, a government motion is necessary for a court to downwardly
gressional supervision of judges via the PROTECT Act's reporting requirements, prosecu-
tors, too, have "an institutional commitment to the independent administration ofjustice."
See id. But cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding constitution-
ality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
230 See Willing, supra note 203, at IA (quoting former federal prosecutor Anthony
Pacheco, who also suggested that prosecutors would sometimes "signal to the judges that
they won't appeal").
231 See MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.720 cmt. ("As advocates for the United States,
prosecutors should be prepared to argue concerning those adjustments (and, if necessary,
departures allowed by the guidelines) in order to arrive at a final result which adequately
and accurately describes the defendant's conduct of offense, criminal history, and other
factors related to sentencing.").
232 Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
233 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-3.9 (b) (iii) (suggesting that prosecutors con-
sider if the authorized punishment fits the crime when charging the defendant).
234 But see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-WGY,
CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (arguing that
"the ways in which the Guidelines regime have transferred the power of sentencing to the
Department add up to a joining of the power to prosecute and the power to sentence in
one branch of government").
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depart if a defendant provides "substantial" assistance. 23 5 Ethical
guidelines also require a prosecutor to consider the relationship be-
tween the crime and the punishment. This suggests, at a minimum,
that she has a duty not to contest a departure that would result in a
more 'just" sentence, given the defendant's culpability. While ajudge
may still deviate from a sentence agreed to in a plea bargain-as
Judge Patterson did in the United Nations shooter case 2 6-the Fee-
ney Amendment reporting requirements raise the possibility that a
judge's decision to downwardly depart could be costly and ultimately
ineffective due to the de novo review of the departure. 237
235 See, e.g., Freed, supra note 159, at 1710-11 (suggesting that the Sentencing Commis-
sion "[c]ntirely on its own prerogative ... inserted the requirement of a government mo-
tion as a prerequisite to a judicial decision to reduce a nonmandatory sentence"); see also
id. at 1711 n.162 (listing cases in which courts required government motions to depart
before it would downwardly depart).
2-36 See Patricia Hurtado, UN Shooter Sentenced to 27 Months in Prison, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21,
2003, at AI6.
In showing ... [a] postal worker who fired shots at the United Nations to
protest human rights abuses in North Korea .. .leniency, [U.S. District
Judge Robert] Patterson yesterday blasted Congress for limiting or "squeez-
ing" federal judges by not giving them the leeway they previously had to
stray from the strict federal sentencing guidelines. Patterson also addressed
some media reports that criticized his view of the case.
"On the one hand, we must sentence in accordance with the law,
yet.., we must render a fair and just sentcnce based on the uniquc facts
with which we are sometimes confronted," Patterson said.
Id. Eastern District of New YorkJudge Sterling Johnson, Jr. has publicly flaunted the Fee-
ney Amendment by sealing presentencing reports, plea agreements, and any other relevant
sentencing documents in any case before him. See Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at *14 (citing
Amended Admin. Order 2004-04, In re Sealing of All Pre-Sentence Reports, Plea Agree-
ments and All Other Relevant Sentencing Documents for All Criminal Cases Pending
Before the Honorable Sterling Johnson, Jr. (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://
www.nyed.uscourts.gov/adminorder04-04.pdf). His colleague Jack Weinstein has "ordered
videotaping of all sentencing hearings due to the Feeney Amendment's requirement that
appellate courts conduct de novo review of a district court's departure from the Guide-
lines." Id. at 68-69 (citing In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
237 See Ashcrofi Overreaches, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 12, 2003, at 14 ("Federal
Judge James Rosenbaum of Minnesota has been harassed by sentencing hawks on the
House Judiciary Committee, who consider him too lenient."). But see United States v. Van-
Leer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 2003) (Cassell, J.) ("[T]his court wishes to
observe that it is not concerned about close scrutiny of its downward (or upward) depar-
ture decisions by Congress, the public, or otherwise."); Willing, supra note 203, at IA.
While one can argue that all federal judges should be as bold as Judge Cassell, this aspira-
tional standard means little to an attorney or a defendant standing before a timid judge.
This statement may appear a bit schizophrenic as federal prosecutors are responsible
for reporting downwardly departing judges under the PROTECT Act. See MANUAL, supra
note 39, § 9-2.170(B). Nevertheless, downward departures that the government did not
request provide one criteria in several categories of adverse sentencing decisions that the
prosecutor is required to report. See, e.g., id. (listing categories). The Ashcroft Memoran-
dum's strictures on requesting or acceding to downward departures could thus conceivably
require a prosecutor to report a judge under the PROTECT Act as implemented in the
U.S. Attorney's Manual. See id.; Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6.
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As an administrator ofjustice, the prosecutor has a responsibility
to aid in its realization. This duty certainly includes effective and elo-
quent advocacy on behalf of the government she represents. But it
also requires a concomitant recognition that she must weigh the facts
of each case and in some instances acknowledge that a more just re-
sult would occur if the judge departed from the Sentencing Guide-
lines. The Ashcroft Memorandum does not permit a prosecutor to
"seek justice" where justice demands a downward departure. 238
C. A Brief Response to the 'Justice Requires Uniformity"
Argument
Some suggest that any potential disparity across jurisdictions is a
greater injustice than restricting prosecutorial discretion or curtailing
judges' abilities to consider mitigating factors in sentencing.239 They
argue that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, "l[t] the length of time a
person spent in prison appeared to depend on 'what the judge ate for
breakfast' on the day of sentencing, on which judge you got, or on
other factors that should not have made a difference to the length of
the sentence. '240 The Ashcroft Memorandum implicitly supports this
view. 24 '
Others take a more nuanced view. Professor Albert Alschuler de-
scribes the "movement from individualized to aggregated sentences"
and argues that inflexible sentencing guidelines are "a backward step
238 Prosecutors are permitted to seek upward departures as warranted, though the pro-
cedures for upwardly departing post-Blakely are still uncertain as of this writing. Enhancing
a sentence may be necessary for a more just result in some cases. By arguing for enhanced
sentences for more egregious defendants and decreased sentences for less-culpable de-
fendants, prosecutors can help make rational and appropriate distinctions between offend-
ers. Such variances should be amenable to the Sentencing Commission, which
contemplated a twenty percent departure rate from the Guidelines. See generally 149 CONG.
REc. S6711-12 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that judges
depart from the Guidelines over the objection of the government slightly more than ten
percent of the time). This observation rebuts arguments that the Commission and Con-
gress did not intend to let officials responsible for sentencing federal defendants deviate
from the Guidelines.
239 See, e.g., Criminal Justice Oversight Subcommittee Hearing on "Oversight of the United States
Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Followed?": Hearing Before the Senate Judiciay
Comm. Criminal Justice Oversight Subcomm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT. REP. 317, 317 (2003).
240 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2554 (2004) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (citing studies finding that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, "punishments for
identical crimes in the Second Circuit ranged from 3 to 20 years' imprisonment and that
sentences varied depending upon religion, gender of the defendant, and race of the defen-
dant" (citations omitted)).
241 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7 ("Fundamental fairness requires
that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal justice system be subject to the same
standards and treated in a consistent manner.").
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in the search for just criminal punishments. '242 He suggests that uni-
formity should not be the only goal of the sentencing system. 243 For
instance, a regime that prescribed five-year terms for everything from
littering to murder would be uniform, but would not reflect most con-
ceptions of equaljustice.244 Instead, "[e] quality does not mean same-
ness; the term more commonly refers to the consistent application of
a comprehensible principle or mix of principles to different cases.
Excessive aggregation-treating unlike cases alike-can violate rather
than promote the principle of equality. 245
The Justice Department should trust its prosecutors to consider
facts more nuanced than the broadly sketched elements of an offense
rather than focusing on "provable uniformity. ' 2 4 6 Provable uniformity
should take a backseat to actual uniformity, which requires individual
prosecutors abiding by ethical mandates to weigh mitigating circum-
stances reflected in the "seriousness of the defendant's conduct,"2 47
but not captured by the "facts of the case."248 Moreover, a focus on
actual uniformity is reflected in the Sentencing Reform Act, which
spawned the Sentencing Guidelines and sought to prevent "unwar-
ranted disparities," in sentencing. 249 Individualized justice does not
subvert Congressional intent.
Alschuler himself recognizes that "widespread injustice is more to
be deplored than isolated injustice .... [However, t]he injustice that
242 See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 902. Alschuler suggests that the Guidelines "dehu-
manized the sentencing process" by focusing on "social harm" to the exclusion of the indi-
vidual defendant's culpability. Id. at 903.
24'3 Id. at 916.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 One achieves provable uniformity by ensuring that Defendant A, tried in Leftland
by Lucy Liberal and convicted of federal Crime X, serves the same amount of time as
Defendant B, tried in Rightville by Cathy Conservative, also convicted of Crime X. Actual
uniformity contemplates that prosecutors may recognize differences between the relative
culpability of Defendant A and Defendant B that are not reflected entirely by the elements
of the crime and may appropriately argue that they should receive different sentences.
247 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422.
248 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1. This point is one place where the
connotations of the Ashcroft Memoranda and Thornburgh Memoranda diverge. See supra
Part ll.B.
249 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (2000) (admonishingjudges to "avoid unwarranted dis-
parities"); 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1) (B) (2000) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid-
ing unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while main-
taining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when war-
ranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices
); 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2000) (explaining that Sentencing Commission duties include "pro-
viding certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence dispari-
ties"). Finally, courts should impose a sentence that is "sufficient, but not greater than
necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
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occurs in a single case is not diminished because it does not occur in
others, nor is it diminished by the fact that it makes only a ripple in
statistical patterns. '" 25°1 All districts will have a few "outlier" cases dem-
onstrating a clear disparity between the defendant's actual culpability
and the charges he could face or the sentence to which he could be
exposed. In such cases, the Attorney General should trust prosecutors
to abide by their ethical mandates and recognize mitigating circum-
stances not fully captured in the statutory elements provable in a par-
ticular case. 251
This model necessarily requires that each U.S. Attorney exercise
the same degree of care in selecting prosecutors that James Comey
suggested he used when he spoke to the 2003 Southern District of
New York summer interns. 252 It also requires the Justice Department
to trust these selected men and women to faithfully carry out their
duties to the U.S. Government, to abide by the ethical mandates that
govern their behavior, and to aspire to their larger and grander duty
to seek justice. Finally, of course, it requires that individual prosecu-
tors themselves remain faithful to their duty to seek justice.
Thus, prosecutors need not be required to "charge and pursue
the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are sup-
ported by the facts of the case" to ensure that defendants are treated
consistently.2 53 The Justice Department could achieve actual uniform-
ity by permitting prosecutors to recognize the outlier cases and treat
them accordingly. The Attorney General should not force prosecu-
tors to "squeeze fairness" 254 into the document defining their discre-
250 Alschuler, supra note 18, at 905.
251 Of course, recognizing that each jurisdiction will have "outlier" cases does not pre-
clude review of those cases to ensure that defendant characteristics such as race, gender,
and class do not impermissibly correlate with prosecutorial clemency.
252 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
253 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
254 See Hechler, supra note 15, at 25. (quoting Zachary Carter, former U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of New York, who believed that "U.S. attorneys [could still] squeeze
fairness into these policies," as the memo "makes an attempt to constrict discretion, but it
doesn't do so absolutely"). Unfortunately, individual attorneys may fail to recognize their
potential ability-and possible ethical duty-to "squeeze fairness" out of the Ashcroft
Memorandum. Conversely, the Ashcroft Memorandum might not reduce the supposed
disparities that it was intended to quell. In fact, the Memorandum could enhance the
disparities if some attorneys believe that the current ethos militates against permitting any
prosecution or sentencing less than the maximum. If the same attorneys who would have
chosen to overtly pursue a lesser offense in a given case figure out how to covertly do so by
reading in some flexibility, they may strain against the Ashcroft Memorandum's require-
ments. See id. (noting that "the notion of what is a readily provable offense is highly subjec-
tive" (quoting Zachary Carter) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thornburg remarks,
however, that loyalty would lead most U.S. Attorneys to cooperate, but that every Attorney
General still fires several who won't "take orders." See id. Regardless of whether prosecu-
tors could "get away" with reading flexibility into the Ashcroft Memorandum, the fact that
a federal prosecutor might have to subvert her boss's directives to fulfill her duty to "seek
justice" is deeply troubling.
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tion, but rather should encourage prosecutors to abide by the ethical
mandates that guide their responsibilities as "minister [s] ofjustice. ' '255
D. If Uniformity is Necessary, Why Make an Exception for
Fast-Track Programs?
One approved exception to the Ashcroft Memorandum's require-
ment that every attorney seek and pursue the highest possible charge
is the "fast-track" program. The fast-track program is "an expedited
disposition program whereby the Government agrees to charge less
than the most serious, readily provable offense" 256 that is intended to
relieve congestion in U.S. Attorney's offices and the courts. 25 7 Fast-
track programs provide "an offer of extraordinary sentence reductions
to defendants willing to plead guilty pre-indictment to an informa-
tion. '258 For instance, the Southern District of California offers low-
level narcotics offenders caught crossing the Mexican-American bor-
der a substantial sentence reduction in exchange for a guilty plea.2 59
While fast-track programs can be viewed as an imperfect compro-
mise necessary to address an overburdened judiciary,260 they unques-
255 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-1.2(b).
256 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3; see also PROTECT Act § 401 (in) (2) (B),
117 Stat 650, 675 (2003).
257 See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995).
258 See Frank 0. Bowman, IllI& Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IowA L. REv. 477, 550
(2002).
259 Id. Defendants who pleaded guilty under this fast-track program usually received a
seven-level downward departure. See id. This departure may have been so appealing as to
tempt defendants who were innocent to plead guilty and avoid the possibility of a much
longer sentence. While there is nothing unconstitutional about this, see North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970), it is nonetheless troubling. See generally Stephanos Pibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and
Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. Rev. 1361 (2003) (arguing that, in criminal Justice,
substance is too often divorced from procedure). Fast-track programs, however, are now
limited to-at most-a four level downward departure. See PROTECT Act
§ 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003); Memorandum Regarding Department Princi-
ples for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or Fast-Track Prosecution Program in a
District, from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All United States Attorneys 1 (Sept. 22,
2003) [hereinafter Fast-Track Memorandum], available at http://www.nacdl.org/pub-
lic.nsf/2cddO2b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/FasttrackAGrequire
ments.pdf.
260 Fast-track programs can, however, prevent defendants from escaping punishment
entirely on speedy trial grounds if the system is too overburdened to try them in a timely
manner. (Thanks to Professor Stephen F. Smith for this point.) Nevertheless,
prosecutorial resources will be strained by the Ashcroft Memorandum's charging require-
ments, and these requirements will heighten the sentencing disparity between the "lucky"
defendant in ajurisdiction with a fast-track program for his crime and the "unlucky" defen-
dant without the fast-track windfall.
Further, Defendants will soon learn that the Ashcroft Memorandum curtails a prose-
cutor's discretion to give them leniency in a plea bargain. This will likely result in more
trials, which will use more prosecutorial and judicial resources, which will result in a
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tionably undercut the proffered purpose of the Ashcroft
Memorandum: "to ensure that all federal criminal cases are prose-
cuted according to the same standards. '26' The PROTECT Act did
limit the availability of these programs,26 2 yet they are still allowed if
the judicial and prosecutorial resources of the district would be too
strained by the number of a particular category of cases.2 63 Permitting
fast-track programs undermines the claim that "[f]undamental fair-
ness requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal
justice system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consis-
tent manner."2 4 Furthermore, altering charging decisions solely to
relieve pressure on an overburdened system but forbidding prosecu-
tors to deviate when injustice would result risks transforming prosecu-
tors into bureaucrats more concerned with administrative efficiency
than justice.
E. The Potential Impact of Blakely v. Washington
In Blakely v. Washingion,265 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional the State of Washington's sentencing guidelines. In its June 24,
2004 opinion, the Court stated that the Washington guidelines uncon-
stitutionally permitted a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence
above the statutory maximum of the standard range because thejudge
made a factual finding that he acted with "deliberate cruelty." 266 Pre-
Blakely, for a court to use information to increase the defendant's sen-
tence, the government needed only to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant's conduct fit into certain enhance-
ment categories or that he committed additional crimes-regardless
of whether he had been charged with or convicted by ajury for those
crimes. 26 7 The Court expressly refused to decide whether its holding
implicated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.2 68 After Blakely, how-
ever, the component of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that per-
mits judges to find facts that increase the defendant's maximum
greater need for fast-track programs, which will, in the end, possibly result in worse dispar-
ity than that which allegedly prompted the Attorney General to write the Memorandum.
261 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
262 See PROTECT Act § 401(m) (2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
263 In a memorandum distributed the same day as the Ashcroft Memorandum that is
the subject of this Note, Ashcroft described the requirements for local jurisdictions to dis-
patch with cases using a fast-track system. See Fast-Track Memorandum, supra note 259, at
1-2. Fast-track programs require authorization from Ashcroft and will only be permitted in
"exceptional circumstances." See id. at 1.
264 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
265 542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
266 See id. at 2534.
267 See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 (1997).
268 See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.
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sentence beyond that warranted by the jury's fact finding may be
unconstitutional. 2
69
Courts, commentators, and Congress have begun debating
Blakely's impact on the federal system. The Supreme Court quickly
granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in United States v. Booker
and United States v. Fanfan on October 4, 2004.270 Whether the five-
Justice Blakely bloc will hold is still being debated as this Note goes to
press. While the Department of Justice (contrary to suggestions in its
Blakely brief271 ) claimed that Blakely does not apply to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 272 the Department nevertheless required its pros-
ecutors to seek waivers of Blakely rights. 2 73 In the Eastern District of
Virginia, Judge Leonie Brinkema refused to accept these waivers until
a higher court ruled on their constitutionality.2 74
Should the triple punch of Blakely, Booker, and Fanfan invalidate
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, many of the suggested replace-
ments have the potential to shift even more power and discretion to
the prosecutor. 275 For example, most proposals place greater weight
on the charges to determine the sentence; filing charges remains the
exclusive province of the prosecutor.2 76 Giving prosecutors absolute
269 See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.
2004) (same), cert. granted 73 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S. Aug 2, 2004) (No. 04-104); Fanfan v.
United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), cert. granted beforejudg-
ment 73 U.S.L.W. 3073, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (No. 04-105). But see United
States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Duncan, 381 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.
2004) (same); United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); United
States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same); United States v.
Pinerio, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (same).
270 See Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar For the Session Begin-
ning October 4, 2004, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment calendars/monthlyargumentcaloctober2004.pdf (revised Aug. 23, 2004).
271 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Blakely v. Washington, 524
U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) ("[A] decision invalidating judicial depar-
ture authority here could call into question the constitutionality of the federal
Guidelines.").
272 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Comey, to All Federal Pros-
ecutors 1 (July 2, 2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentenc-
ing-law.and-policy/files/dag blakely-memo_7204.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2004);
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Chris Wray, to All Federal Prosecutors 5,
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and policy/files/
chris_.wray.doj.memo.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
27-1 See Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, High Court Decision Sows Confusion on Sentencing
Rules, WASH. PosT, July 13, 2004, at A01.
274 See id.
275 See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cataloguing and analyzing
the ways in which legislatures may handle sentencing post-Blakely, noting that a pure
charge offense system "gives tremendous power to prosecutors through their choice of
charges"); Blakely Senate Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor
of Law, Indiana University School of Law).
276 See supra Part I.A.
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control over defendants' sentences may present separation of powers
issues 277 and makes it even more vital for prosecutors to abide by their
duty to seekjustice. The Supreme Court of Arizona, for instance, rec-
ognized that "a prosecutor is held to a higher standard of conduct
than an ordinary attorney [as her] duty is to seek justice" and held
that "refus [ing] to allege mitigating circumstances which the sentenc-
ing judge might consider meddles unduly with judicial power."2 7
New Jersey similarly responded to separation of powers problems by
permitting judicial oversight to "ferret[ ] out arbitrary and capricious
prosecutorial decisions. ' 279 Such concerns about prosecutors' power
and responsibility should guide Congress, the courts, and the Attor-
ney General in drafting new Sentencing Guidelines and prosecutorial
policies more consistent with the prosecutor's duty to seek justice.
The issues addressed in this Note, therefore, remain relevant re-
gardless of the post-Blakely/Booker/Fanfan landscape. The fact remains
that the Ashcroft Memorandum will still require prosecutors to
"charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or of-
fenses that are supported by the facts of the case." 2 0 Furthermore, if
any downward departure scheme remains in place (i.e., one which
provides for a "standard" sentence and requires defendants to ask for
downward departures28 1 ), the Memorandum will still require prosecu-
tors to "not request or accede" to them.2 1 2 Finally, the ethical duty of
prosecutors to "seek justice" will surely be the same.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors are uniquely situated to "seek justice" because they
are familiar with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
individual cases they prosecute. The Ashcroft Memorandum unduly
277 See United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-WGY, CR.
A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32-33 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (suggesting that
prosecutor's power over sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines coupled with
the passage of the Feeney Amendment creates "concerns about executive encroachment
and aggrandizement"); United States v. Detwiler, CR 03-372-PA, 2004 WL 2244532, at
*6-14 (D. Or. Oct. 5, 2004) (holding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional
on separation of powers grounds, as they grant the executive branch both the power to
prosecute and the power to sentence); State v. Gonzalez, 603 A.2d 516, 519 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992); see also State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. 1989) ("[Olnce the
legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature
cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to
review that discretion.").
278 Prentiss, 786 P.2d at 937 (construing the Arizona constitution).
279 See Gonzalez, 603 A.2d at 520.
280 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2.
281 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __ , 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2558 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
282 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6. But see Prentiss, 786 P.2d at 937; Gonza-
lez, 603 A.2d at 520.
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constrains a prosecutor's discretion to charge a lesser offense that
more fairly reflects a defendant's individual culpability. This directive
can place a prosecutor in an untenable position: she must either re-
spect the ethical precepts handed down by the common law, promul-
gated in the Manual, and passed by the American Bar Association, or
abide by the Ashcroft Memorandum.
More importantly, perhaps, requiring a prosecutor to uniformly
oppose downward departures is a clear movement away from the pros-
ecutor's role as an administrator of justice. The Sentencing Guide-
lines were properly and necessarily developed to address generalities
and cannot reflect the precise culpability of a defendant without per-
mitting the flexibility of upward or downward departures in certain
cases. The countervailing consideration of uniformity does not miti-
gate the discretion-stripping effected by the Ashcroft Memorandum,
nor does it address or obviate the individual prosecutor's duty to seek
justice.
The Supreme Court recognized that "we must have assurance
that those who would wield [prosecutorial] power will be guided
solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of jus-
tice."28 3 Unfortunately, the Ashcroft Memorandum demands that fed-
eral prosecutors sacrifice individualized justice upon the altar of
uniformity. By doing so, it threatens to turn justice into nothing more
than the "fortuitous residue of the process in which the prosecutor
participates" rather than the guiding principle for every aspect of her
job.284
28- Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
284 Melilli, supra note 1, at 702.
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